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QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
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Economists and some lawyers argue that environmental
degradation results from an absence of property rights, a condi-
tion that opens the enVironment to iU-treatment as a "commons,"
in which any environmental resource is treated as "just a given".
But as Professor Rose points out, conventional forms of property
rights can also can also damage environmental resources, while
bureaucratic forms of management can be complex, expensive,
and coercive. In this Article, Rose suggests that environmental
ethics may yield an alternative or supplemental approach to man-
aging environmental resources, in which the environment is seen
not as a ''given'' but as a ''gift.'' With commons problems in mind,
she examines three possible sources for genuinely conservationist
environmental ethics: indigenous peoples's practices, biologic
rights, and older forms ofcommon property.
I. ENVIRONMENT-A GIVEN OR A GlFr?
This article is about some important ways in which property
relates to the environment. The most ob"ious and noticeable point
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M.A. 1963, University of Chicago; B.A. 1962, Antioch College. This article is
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is that in many ways, the relationship between property and the
environment is one of opposites. Property is about things that are
under our control; in fact, having control of something is a way to
prove that you own it. Even our ordinary adages make this point:
everyone knows the saying, "possession is nine-tenths of the law,"
meaning that if you control something, the law is very likely to
say that you own it.
On the other hand, the word "environment" in ordinary lan-
guage often designates something that is not under anyone's con-
trol at all, something that is a given, or as we often say, "just a
given." We talk, for example, about a. business environment or a
cultural environment: a set of amorphous surroundings that are
just "out there," and that we cannot do very much about.
When we talk about "the environment" without any modifi-
ers, we are usually talking about aspects of our physical surround-
ings, such as air and water. But these physical surroundings, too,
are almost by definition "out of control," and hence outside the
comfortable range of property. The elements of the unmodified
environment are wild things, and the wilderness habitat of wild
things, and include the figuratively "wild" resources like under-
groimd fluids that our law calls ferae naturae, by analogy to un-
tamed animals on the loose. 1
Historically, we have had quite mixed emotions about this
quality of uncontrolled "given-ness". There are many stories and
myths about wilderness, for example, and quite a number of these
fall into one of two quite striking categories of horror stories.
Both categories revolve about the unowned, property-less char-
acter of the wild, and about what happens when wild things are
transformed into property.
One type of horror story is exemplified by some comments
that Jeremy Bentham made in a very forceful argument that pros-
perity depends on security of property.2 For Bentham, the North
American wilderness presented a decidedly bleak picture. "The
1. For ferae naturae applied to animals, see the classic case Pierson v.
Post, 3 CaL R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); for analogies to other resources, see
Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A 724, 725 (pa.
1889) (groundwater, oil and natural gas analogized to ferae naturae).
2. JEREMY BENTHAM, Analysis of the Evils which result from Attacks
upon Property, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 70 (Oceana ed. 1975).
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interior of that immense region," he wrote, "offers only a frightful
solitude, impenetrable forests or sterile plains, stagnant waters
and impure vapours; such is the earth when left to itself."3 He
commented on the "fierce tribes" that wandered about in the for-
ests and plains, animated chiefly by the "implacable rivalries" that
led them to make constant war on each other: "The beasts of the
forests are not so dangerous to man as he is to himself."4 But
Bentham thought that the lands of the settlers, with their secure
property, offered a particularly instructive comparison. The set-
tlers had reduced the dangerous and gloomy wildness to property.
They el\ioyed smiling fields, well-built and populous towns, bus-
tling harbors, and in general presented a picture of "peace and
abundance. "5
Bentham's horror story is thus one in which wilderness is a
dark and frightening chaos that becomes sunny and happy only as
it vanishes, ceding to property. But there is a counter-horror story
too, comprised of many of the narratives we know about the
transformation of the wilderness to property. These are stories
that begin in innocence and splendor, a pure state that is then
subjected to a storm of rampage and heedlessness. Perhaps the
most dazzling epiphany of this sort of narrative involved a partic-
ularly eerie moment on the Great Plains in the fall of 1883.6 It
was the outset of a buffalo hunting season that, it was thought,
would repeat the fabled slaughters of the decade before. But the
buffalo hunters, fully outfitted and ready for another riotous orgy
of killing, stepped off the train to find only the silence of an emp-
ty plain.7
We all know both these types of stories at some level and in
some version. These archetypical narratives exemplify two differ-
ent views of wilderness, and indeed two different views of the
uncontrolled environment in general. The first story, the one that
3. Id. at 72.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE WlLDlJFE? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CONSERVATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 100-102 (1981) (in part quoting
William Hornaday, The Extermination of the American Bison, with a Sketch of
Its Discovery and Life History, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. NATIONAL Mu-
SEUM 504 (Washington, D.C. 1887).
7. Id.
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Bentham told, is a vision of the given-ness of nature, and it tells
us how deeply problematic that given-ness is. Bentham's story
points to the malevolence of those things that are out of con-
trol-they are miasmic, shadowy, and filled with sudden violence.
This story has a moral too, as many stories do:8 it tells us that the
"given" environment should be reduced to tame and placid proper-
ty as rapidly as possible.
The second archetypical horror story rests on a vision of the
environment that is not just a given, but a gift. Stories of this type
are tales of bitter malevolence too, but here the malevolence is
the human interaction with the great gifts of nature. It is an inter-
action that despoils and ravages, that treats with contempt and
callousness the things that should be revered, at least in part be-
cause they are somehow gifts.
II. ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE COMMONS
Modem economists are in many ways successors to
Bentham, generally arguing that the reduction of unowned objects
to property is a good thing because property rights bring wealth
and peace.9 Private property regimes identify who has what, so
that people can trade things instead of fighting over them. Just as
importantly, private property regimes give owners the security
that encourages them to invest time and effort in their goods in-
stead of wasting them. lo
But the modem economists also acknowledge the narratives
of despoliation in a way that Bentham did not. Bentham's story
moved effortlessly from vicious wilderness to prosperous farms,
8. For narration as a source of moral authority, see DAVID CARR, TiME,
NARRATIVE AND HISTORY 156-57 (1986); HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF TIlE
FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 25 (1987); for
narratives of property, see Carol M. Rose, Property as StoryteUing: Perspec-
tives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMANmES 37 (1990).
9. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 30 (3d ed. 1986);
see also Harold Demsetz, Professor Michelman's Unnecessary and. Futile
Search for the Philosopher's Touchstone, ETIllcs, ECONOMICS AND TIlE LAw, 24
NOMOS 41, 46 (1982) (noting that a major purpose of property regimes is con-
flict avoidance).
10. POSNER, supra note 8, at 30; Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal
Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 321-22 (1985).
HeinOnline -- 24 Envtl. L.  5 1994
1994] GIVEN-NESS AND GIFT 5
skipping the intermediate stages that ravaged the once-wild land-
scape. lJ But a number of modem economists have noticed this
intermediate stage and have related it to the particular problems
of establishing property rights in the things we call "environmen-
tal."
This in-between, transitional stage has to do with the way un-
owned things become owned. The normal way to establish proper-
ty rights in completely unowned things, like seashells or aban-
doned umbrellas, is simply to take them, and to act as if they are
subject to one's control.12 A much-used example of the creation
of property is the taking of wild animals: the animal is made into
property by "reducing it to dominion," under what is called the
Rule of Capture.13
But with environmental resources, these normal ways of
establishing property rights do not work very well. In fact, they
lead to a great deal of destruction, because the goods that we
consider environmental usually belong to a kind of natural com-
mons.14 Environmental resources are difficult to compartmental-
ize into individual chunks that can be taken without affecting
other chunks. In using up air, for example, a factory can scarcely
confine the smoke it gives off to a manageable little cube of
space; instead, the factory's smoke may get into the air hundreds
of miles away. Even when these resources look as if they can be
taken in individual chunks, they may actually be part of some
larger-scale renewable stocks, and the continued existence and
value of these stocks entails leaving behind (or artificially replen-
ishing) an unused reservoir from which the resource can regener-
ate. Thus, for example, individual fIsh may be taken from a fIsh
stock, or individual animals may be taken from a wildlife stock.
But in either case, enough must be left behind to repopulate the
11. A modem-<lay teller of the Bentham story, Harold Demsetz, tracks
Bentham in smoothing over this move from the property-less to the propertied
state; see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM ECON.
REV. 347 (pap. & Proc. 1967), reprinted in JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER,
PROPERTY 42-49 (3d ed 1993); see also the editors' critique, id. at 59-62.
12. See Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GEORGIA 1.
REV. 1221 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
13. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
14. See WIWAM QPHULS, EcoLOGY AND THE POUTICS OF SCARCITY: PROWGUE
TO A POUTICAL THEORY OF THE STEADY STATE 147 (1977).
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larger wild stock; otherwise the population will eventually decline
or even crash, and future fishers and hunters may not get any at
all. 15 Similarly, but in a more complicated fashion, the multitudi-
nous plants of the Amazon rain forest appear to nourish one an-
other in a complex energy and water exchange that is disrupted
by massive burn offs or cuttings, whose impact cannot be easily
isolated. 16
It is for these reasons that our usual property-defIning act,
the unregulated rule of capture, turns into a horror story for these
great natural commons. These great commons need to be man-
aged as wholes. But because they are so large, no one in particu-
lar can acquire them as wholes, and so sometimes no one manag-
es them or reinvests in them at all. Instead, everyone just uses
them or takes from them at will. Their great vast wildness seems
infInitely exploitable, and puts no bounds on human acquisitive-
ness. And so sometimes human acquisitiveness itself goes wild:
each human actor, fearing to be last in the race to capture the
vast wild things, vies with all the others to take while the taking is
free.
Through a series of small decisions, the larger environmental
resource is wasted, even though it might be in the collective best
interest to preseIVe it. Air gets polluted, fIsheries get fIshed out,
forests get felled, bird populations get depleted, and aquifers get
pumped dry. In general, people seem to vie to get the most for
themselves, while investing the least. All too often, people leave
behind a wasteland, where the resources are exhausted to a point
that they cannot renew themselves.
From the perspective of any individual, of course, it is entire-
ly sensible to use as much as possible for one's self from common
resources: if anyone person invests in replenishment, or refrains
from polluting, everyone else can take advantage of him or her.
15. For the classic economic analysis, see H. Scott Gordon, The Ecorwmic
Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POI. ECON. 124
(1954). For some alternative approaches, see Ralph Townsend & James A Wil-
son, An Ecorwmic View of the Tragedy of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF
THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 311, 321-25
(Bonnie McCay & James M. Acheson 008. 1987) [hereinafter McCay &
Acheson).
16. See JUAN DE ONIS, THE GREEN CATHEDRAL: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
BRAZIL 91-93 (1992).
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Nice guys fInish last in this logic; what they replenish or leave in
place is simply snatched up by someone else. And so it does not
make a lot of sense to be nice in the fIrst place. The well-known
name for this process, in which everyone takes and no one gives,
is the "tragedy of the commons."17 The logic of the "tragedy" is to
give everyone what the economists call a "high discount rate," in
which the prospect of current income outweighs considerations of
future well-being.18 Resources that could be profItably renewed
are instead exploited to the hilt now, and thus they are
transformed into wasting assets. What is perhaps most tragic of all
is that even well-intentioned people-people who know better and
would like to do better--can hardly avoid the ruthlessly destruc-
tive logic of self interest.19
TIl. SELF-INTEREST, POLITICS, NORMATIVITY: FROM GIVEN-NESS
To GIFT
We know in a general way what needs to be done about envi-
ronmental resources that we want to use but also want to pre-
serve: we need to devise some way whereby people can take some
of the resource, but also leave some behind or contribute to resto-
ration, confIdent that what is left will not be snatched by others
but will instead be used as a replenishment stock.20 But how can
we arrange this? Bentham's successors have noticed the problem,
but can they tell us how we might prevent the well-known trage-
dy? Can they tell us how to preserve these resources, like the
oceans or the air or the habitats and stocks of wild things, that we
cannot easily turn into private property?
17. The name comes from Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); the original modem analysis of this problem was
Scott Gordon's article on fishing, supra note 15.
18. For a survey of discount rates and their effect in environmental deci-
sions, see Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Fu-
ture: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 267 (1993).
19. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER
187 (1989) (persons motivated by a norm of fairness and a willingness to co-
operate if others do could not arrive at cooperative solutions).
20. Cf ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTI- .
TIJTlONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30-33 (1990) (arguing that restraining appropria-
tion from a common pool resource should be analyzed separately from secur-
ing contribution to common-pool outputs).
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Well, yes and no. One standard answer is to turn the great
commons into a kind of great big property, usually owned by a
government. When governments become the unified owners of
these great resources, they will supposedly maximize the value of
the commons by restraining individual use to amounts whereby
the resources can restore themselves at their value-maximizing
levels.21
Unfortunately, this is not a smooth or costless enterprise. A
variety of regulatory strategies exist to restrain individual use, but
these strategies are costly to institute and police-and ever more
costly as we need to exercise more and more control to preserve
environmental resources like clean air or water or currently un-
developed land.22 In addition, environmental controls may involve
highly technical decisions that are beyond most people's grasp. We
may have to hire expensive experts to make these decisions for
us, and we do not really know which experts to believe, if any.23
Then too, if environmental controls succeed in restraining individ-
ual use, they will make environmental goods harder to obtain, and
this is bound to be reflected in the higher prices of any products
that contain them. The increased prices of, for example, porpoise-
protective tuna fish or environmentally safe paper products may
create strong incentives to cheat, both on the part of producers of
fish products and paper and on the part of those who buy these
products.24 The problem of policing cheaters then adds even
more to the cost of environmental controls. Many people may not
21. Id. at 8-9 (discussing governmental solutions, but rejecting arguments
that they are the "only way" to solve commons problems).
22. Id. at 10-11; see also James Krier & W. David Montgomery, Resource
AUocation, I1iformation Cost and the Form of Government Intervention, 13
NAT. RES. J. 89, 96-99 (1973); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Con-
trols, 1991 DUKE L J. I, 12, 14-24 (1991).
23. OPHULS, supra note 13, at 157-59; see also Clayton P. Gillette & James
E. Krier, The Un-Easy Case fOT Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L REV. 405,
422-27 (1985) (technological decisions are essentially political and are subject
to the flaws of the political process); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regula-
tion and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 91-94 (1988)(regulatory
decisions are necessarily based on incomplete science, but may give illusion of
accuracy, thus reducing political accountability).
24. See, e.g. Rose Gutfild, Eight of 10 Americans Are Environmentalists,
At Least So They Say, WAll. ST. J. Aug. 2, 1991, at A-I (reporting conflict be-
tween people's stated environmentalism and consumption choices based on
price and convenience).
HeinOnline -- 24 Envtl. L.  9 1994
1994] GIVEN-NESS AND GIFT 9
care enough to pay the price, here and now, for environmental
protection that is only noticeable later and maybe someplace else,
even though the wider and longer-term costs of degradation may
be much higher.
Finally, even if many people are indeed willing to pay the
price, regulation itself does not always run easily toward desired
ends. Regulatory agencies themselves sometimes become the bat-
tlefields where· the resource users vie to establish their domi-
nance; in effect, the commons problem in resource use turns into
a commons problem in access to the regulatory agencies.25 The
tendency of democratic regulatory institutions may be that in-
tensely interested groups dominate the regulatory commons, a
tendency that is not likely to benefit the diffuse interests of envi-
ronmental protection.26
For these reasons, it may be thought that a democracy left to
itself is incapable of the self-regulation that environmental well-
being requires. The pessimistic view is that a thoroughgoing at-
tention to the environment may require a Leviathan,27 or perhaps,
as people used to joke about 18th century Prussia, that one-half
the population be turned into an army to guard the other. A mod-
em-dress hint of this is even implicit in the suggestion that the
Environmental Protection Agency should be given the powers of a
kind of super-agency, to whose decisions the other branches of
government defer.28
All this presents a quite unattractive set of options. In effect,
because of the great difficulty of managing the large and diffuse
commons of the environment, we could be left with a choice be-
tween environmental well-being and democracy. If we are to have
25. See Arthur McEvoy, Toward an Interactive Theory of Nature and Cul-
ture: Ecology, Production, and Cognition in the California Fishing Industry,
in THE ENDS OF THE EARTH 211, 223-24 (Donald Worster ed., 1988).
26. The classic in this literature is MANCUR OLSEN, THE LoGIC OF COlLEC-
TIVE ACTION (1965); see also Gillette & Krier, supra note 22, at 424 (contending
that large groups with diffuse interests such as pollution control are disadvan-
taged in legislative action vis-a-vis more concentrated groups acting to avoid
costs).
27. OPHULS, supra note 14, at 162-63.
28. See Bruce Ackerman & William Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal
and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L. J. 1466, 1471-72 (1980) (suggesting that
agency should be insulated from political and judicial intervention).
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environmental good things and democracy at the same time, we
need to exercise some self-restraint. This point, incidentally,
would have been no great secret to the founders of the republic,
who were interested both in Adam Smith's free-market economics
and in the notions of republican virtue.29 In a sense, environmen-
talism is only a particularly pointed example of a recurring prob-
lem in free and democratic governments: the importance of self-
imposed citizen restraints for the sake of a common good.30
Recent work in political economy has brought us back to this
issue, suggesting that a system of norms and conventions may
enable us to overcome some commons problems at relatively low
perceived costs.Sl The chief problem of the commons is that indi-
vidually rational strategies undermine a collective good. The indi-
vidually rational strategy of cheating while others cooperate leads
everyone to cheat, and can decimate the things that would make
us collectively better off.
But if we suppose that most people value the opinions of
others, and if we suppose that most people are perceived to have
a good opinion of behavior that corresponds to some particular
norms or conventional practices, then commons problems may be
overcome relatively painlessly. Under those circumstances, individ-
uals may follow a norm of self-restraint even at some personal
cost, in order to gain and hold the approbation of their fellows.32
Thus, if environmental problems are commons problems, certain
kinds of norms about the environment might be a way of lessen-
ing the very high costs of environmental protection. Environmen-
tal norms could permit us to take some modicum of a given
29. For the Federalists' reading of Adam Smith, see FoRREST McDoNALD,
Novus OROO SECULORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 128
(1985); for their interest in the ideas of republican virtue, see Isaac Kramnick,
TIw Great National Debate, 45 WM. & MARy QUAR. 3, 12 (1988).
30. The importance of virtue in republican government was a special
theme of 1 MONTESQUlEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 42-48 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, Anne M. Cohler trans" 1989).
31. See Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100
ETHIcs 725, 742-45 (1990). See also Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Com-
711011$; Custom, Commerce, and InherenUy Public Property, 53 U. CHI. 1.. REV.
711, 742-46 (1986) (describing customary norms as an informal management
technique for large commons).
32. Pettit, supra note 31, at 742-45.
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resource, while voluntarily restraining ourselves before we ex-
haust the underlying common resource.
It is at this point, of course, where the "given-ness" version of
the environment arrives at a dead end. When we think about envi-
ronmental resources as "just a given," we are regarding their use
as normatively neutral, ethically up for grabs. And because we
have no moral qualms about "givens," nothing except coercion will
hold us back from grabbing all we can. The problem, of course, is
that it may be very costly to institute the coercion necessary to
restrain environmental grabbing. It is technically costly because of
the high price of monitoring and policing those who cheat, and
politically costly because of the sacrifice of free action and demo-
cratic decision making. If we are to. have less costly methods, we
will have to rely on voluntary self-restraint; but voluntary self-
restraint depends on norms.
Even on a quite hard-nosed, cost-benefit analysis of environ-
mental issues, some consideration of environmental norms or
ethics thllS may become an urgent matter. The vision of the envi-
ronment as a "given" may need some help here from that other
vision of the environment, the vision that sees the environment as
"gift ",a .
Does the "gift" vision help? Well, once again, yes and no.
There is scarcely any question that the idea of gift may contain a
strong normative element. We get a sense of this kind of gift-norm
from a book, The Gift Relationship'J.1, written several years ago
by the rather renegade economist, Richard Titrnuss. Titrnuss made
a study of what he saw as a purely altruistic act: the donation of
blood. Titrnuss noted that voluntarily donated blood was viewed
with greater respect by those responsible for its use because vol-
untary donors were more likely to be truthful about their health
and their blood was usually pure.34 Commercially collected blood,
in contrast, was viewed as being more likely to be tainted, be-
cause concealment of impurity was in the seller's interest.35 That
first heedlessness often rippled through later transactions, leading
33. RICHARD TiTMUss, THE GIFT RELATIONSlllP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO s0.-
CIAL POLICY (1971).
34. Id. at 144, 151.
35. Id. at 146-48, 240-241.
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to further callousness, spoilage and waste.36 In a larger sense,
Titmuss's work suggested that all gifts may be approached with a
special kind of care and respect, and it is in this sense that the
vision of the environment-as-gift might help to supply some norms
of self-restraint in the use of commons-using the gift, to be sure,
but having enough respect not to waste or pollute it.
With respect to the environment, the gift-vision has a certain
spiritual quality. The spiritualism of the "gift" underlies some of
the strongest impulses of modem environmentalism, most notably
the aesthetic sensibilities so strongly stirred by Ansel Adams's
haunting photographs of Yosemite or John Muir's deeply sensitive
depictions of his wilderness travels. In our laws, too, we see a cer-
tain effort to recognize spiritual values, most notably in our laws
about wilderness and wild creatures. For example, the Endan-
gered Species Act,37 the Marine Mammal Protection Act,36 and
the National Wild and Scenic Rivers ActJD have sometimes been
discussed in the language of utilitarian preservation of a diverse
gene pool;40 but they still seem to be animated by a much more
emotional sense of the "gift" of our wild areas, and a sympathetic
concern for their 10ss.41
The problem is that in the environmental context, this vision
of nature-as-gift may be too strong to be an appropriate norm of
restraint. The spiritual overtone of the gift may make this vision
incompatible with even a restrained rational use of resources. No
doubt this spiritualism can be a useful antidote to the narrow self-
interest that leads us to the well-known tragedy of the commons
in our use of environmental resources. But as a day-to-day matter,
the rhetoric of environment-as-gift may take us too far in the di-
rection of restraint. What we need is not a complete hands-off
36. Id. at 240-41, 245-46.
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1988).
40. See Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of
Biological Diversity, 18 ECOWGY L.Q. 265, 269-71, 275-77 (1991) (noting utilitar-
ian arguments for biodiversity and their prevalence in public policy debates).
41. As the Wilderness Act of 1964 puts it, the effort is to protect those
places "where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.' 16 U.S.C.
§ 1131(c)(1988). See also Doremus, supra note 40, at 271-75, 279-81 (making
aesthetic and ethical arguments for biodiversity).
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attitude, but rather a norm of use-with-restraint. Thus if the rheto-
ric of "given-ness" makes us normatively insensitive, we might
have to worry that the rhetoric of "gift" makes us normatively
oversensitive.
It is instructive, however, that Titmuss's work on the rhetoric
of gift struck a middle ground-that is, use of gift resources, but
use with care and respect. Can we generate similar environmental
norms through the vision of environmental goods as gifts? Are any
such norms appropriate for the dilemma of the late twentieth
century, where common resources are under increasing pressure,
and where we need an ethic to help us take some, but leave the
rest?
The next part of this article will deal with that question, and
will run through three possible ethics of environment-as-gift: the
environmental norms of indigenous peoples; the environmental
norms of rights and of the categorical imperative; and [mally,
though perhaps unexpectedly, the environmental norms of proper-
ty, but with a focus on common property. This threesome by no
means exhausts the list of environmental norms, a list that has
grown explosively over the last generation;42 but these three van-
tage points do exemplify some of the features of a number of
others in environmental ethics, and thus may be taken as to some
degree representative.
I also want to emphasize that I am going to be speaking of
these norms not on their intrinsic merits, but in a way that might
be thought of as instrumental. The inquiry focuses on the kinds of
norms that will help solve a commons problem, where we want to
find ways to use resources, but in moderation, so as to avoid an
overuse that might ruin otherwise renewable resources. This ap-
proach assumes that people do have some normative impulses,
but that they also have choices about which norms to adopt,43
42. For an historical overview, see RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NA-
TURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETlllcS (1989); for an introduction to some
to the quite varied contemporary literature in this area, see JOSEPH R.
DESJARDINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETlllcs: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL Pm-
WSOPHY (1993).
43. This is implicit in some scholarship on preference formation, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein, Legal Inteiference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.
1129 (1986) (describing a variety of scenarios in which preferences and sys-
tems may be altered by intentional action).
HeinOnline -- 24 Envtl. L.  14 1994
14 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 24:1
and that people do wish to save common resources of all sorts
from premature decimation. Hence my view of norms is instru-
mental in one sense, but in another sense serves a meta-norm of
working together for common ends.44
IV. THREE SOURCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
A. The Environmentalism of Indigenous Peoples
It is probably no accident that modern environmentalism has
coincided with a resurgent interest in the environmental practices
of indigenous peoples, notably hunters and gatherers. There is
something enormously attractive about the emphatically reiterated
respect that these cultures show for wildlife and untrammelled
nature, illustrated by their statements of kinship with particular
animals and plants, and by their stories and pictures aJ1d names of
particular parts of the wild.45 Some of these indigenous attitudes
appear to be extremely widespread over the globe, suggesting that
hunter-gatherers may generate certain kinds of norms of respect,
no matter where they are.
One widespread view of wildlife among indigenous peoples
directly relates to the perception of nature as a gift. Indigenous
people from areas as widely separated as Canada and New Guinea
state variants on this theme, including the view that animals give
themselves to the hunters. This means that the animals' spirits
themselves control the catch.46 The reason that fIsh or game be-
44. Cf., Lawrence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L. J. 1316 (1974) (thinks envi-
ronmenta1ism transcends instrumental or anthropocentric approaches to the
environment).
46. See, e.g., ARTHuR McEvoy, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: EcoWGY AND
LAw IN THE CAlJFORNIA FISHERIES 1860-1980 3~ (1986) (describing Indian fish-
ing ceremonies and legends that animals and trees were ancestors); E. S.
CRAIGHILL HANDY & MARy KAWENA PuKUI, THE POLYNESIAN FAMll.Y SYSTEM IN KA-
U, HAWAI'I 37-39 (detailing the tradition of aumakua among native Hawai-
ians-i.e. particular sharks, other animals, and plants embody the spirit of a
guardian or relative).
46. See, e.g., McEvoy, supra note 46, at 36; Robert A. Brightman, Conser-
vation and Resource Depletion: The Case of the Boreal Forest Algonquians, in
McCay & Acheson, supra note 16, at 121, 137 (suggesting that animal spirits
control the hunt).
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come scarce, say these peoples, is that the animals have decided
to conceal themselves and refuse any longer to give themselves
up; it is the animals' decision and action that matters, rather than
the hunters'.47 Any other view suggests disrespect for the ani-
m~respect that of course will displease the animals and
make them hide all the more.
This set of beliefs, however, suggests why indigenous
peoples' environmental norms may not be appropriate for our own
environmental difficulties. Their respect for the animals may be so
great as to divert indigenous peoples from their own activities as
hunters. Among certain Native American fIShing groups, for exam-
ple, naturalists could not convince anyone that it was appropriate
to ~ount the fISh. Counting, It was thought, would show disrespect
for the flSh. 48 It need hardly be said that counting and taking in-
ventory are fundamental tools qf management, because without
these basic measures, we will not be able to assess the effects of
our actions.49
Indigenous peoples do in fact manage resources quite exten-
sively. Their practices, however, are not necessarily conservation-
ist, and are thought to have contributed to numerous species'
extinctions in prehistoric as well as more recent times.50 In any
event, these practices may not be appropriate to modem condi-
tionS, where environmental resources are noticeably scarce. Some
indigenous patterns no doubt stemmed from a flat and unsenti-
mental disregard for the destruction of species, particularly the
47. Brightman, supra note 46, at 137, 139; James G. Carrier, Marine Ten-
ure and Conservation in Papua New Guinea, in McCay & Acheson, supra
note 15 at 142, 155-56 (poor catches due not to human acts but to fish
learning to hide and to God's will).
48. See Fikret Berkes, Common-Property Resource Management and Cree
Indian Fisheries in Subarctic Canada, in McCay & Acheson, supra note 15,
at 66, 74, 84, 86.
49. See Brightman, supra note 46, at 137 (stressing the need for native
hunters to redefine animal stocks as manageable).
50. For discussion of extinctions, see ALBERT E. COWDREY, TIns LAND, TIns
SOUTH: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HIsToRY 12-13 (1983) (prehistoric extinctions); JAMES
R. MCGOODWlN, CWSIS IN THE WORLD'S F'ISHEWES: PEoPLE, PROBLEMS, AND POL-
ICIES 58-60 (1990) (modem extinctions). For a debunking of romanticized ac-
counts of Native American environmentalism, see James L. Huffman, An Ex-
plomtory Essay on Native Americans and Environmentalism, 63 U. COLO. I..
REV. 901 (1992).
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large and dangerous ones that destroyed plantings or even hunted
humans as prey.51 But some destructive practices seem to have
stemmed directly from the ethic of viewing wildlife as a gift
whose numbers and location were controlled by the animals' own
decisions. and not by human management. Early European frontier
explorers reported that their Native American hosts seemed to go
on an orgy of killing as they hunted, for example gratuitously
destroying bird eggs. Among the hunters' explanations was the
argument that they had to kill all the animals, lest the animals
inform their fellows and hide. They also said that the wildlife
reincarnated itself, and expressed' an opinion repeated by indige-
nous hunters elsewhere as late as the 1960s: that when more were
needed, more would be given.52 Indeed, the more the hunters.
killed, they said, the more the animals would give of them-
selves.53
Less dramatic and less intentionally destructive resource
management techniques also had their dangers. Fire has always
been a major resource management tool among indigenous peo-
ples. It controls undergrowth and enables young plants to grow
for consumption by grazing wildlife, and coincidentally creates the
conditions by which new trees may begin their own growth cy-
cle.54 But we would not have needed the fIres of Yellowstone to
51. COWDREY, supra note 47 at 12·13; if. PAUL GREENOUGH, NATURAE FE-
RAE: HISTORICAL NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF WILD ANIMALS IN COWNIAL AND
POST-COWNIAL SOUTH AsIA 17-20 (1991, draft on file with author) (noting that
man-eating tigers in late 19th century India, saved from shooting by villagers'
fears of retaliation by tiger spirits, were later killed indiscriminately with
greater population pressure and the availability of weapons).
52. See Brightman, supra note 46, at 124, 131, 133; note also that indige-
nous hunters did not see the total availability of wildlife as subject to human
manipulation. See, e.g. id. at 133; see also Carrier, supra note 47, at 152-56
(noting that Papua New Guinea natives do not believe human actions influence
wildlife populations).
53. Brightman, supra note 46, at 130-31. Brightman cautions, however, that
the writers of the period borrowed notoriously from each others' accounts, so
that many reports might have had very few sources.
54. For an extensive discussion of indigenous fire practices, see STEPHEN J.
PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA, 71-83 (1982). See also COWDREY, supra note 47, at 14-
15 (describing eastern Native American use of fire to open landscape, create
browse for deer, encourage certain types of trees, and discourage others); WiL-
UAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COWNISTS, AND THE EcoWGY OF
NEW ENGLAND 49-51 (1983).
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tell us that fIre is a dangerous tool. Indian fIres, too, often raged
out of control.55
An even more important resource management practice
among indigenous peoples is migration, which in a sense is a vari-
ant of the "pulse" hunting and fIshing that is still observed among
indigenous peoples: a pattern of seasonally intense but rotating
harvests of a variety of resources.66 Migration is a part of this
pattern, in which a group hunts intensively in a given area until it
perceives that the wildlife has become scarce, a scarcity that is
normally attributed to the animals' own decision rather than to
human hunting practices. When the group believes that wildlife is
more abundant elsewhere, the members of the group move on.57
The practice of migration does indeed preserve the wildlife
pool, if enough animals are left behind to regenerate.68 But it is a
preservation technique that is compatible only with wide spaces
or plentiful resources, where plants and animals have an opportu-
nity to regenerate in a condition of non-use. Our own needs are
different, even with respect to wildlife. We cannot move on, be-
cause there is often no place to move. If we want wildlife, we
need to retain some portions of more or less wild habitat, even
though the outlying areas are devoted to other uses.59 Needless
to say, many indigenous hunter-gatherer peoples are now in the
same position that the rest of us are in. They cahnot move on
either, since they are surrounded by peoples who use modem
agricultural and manufacturing techniques-techniques that use
the land much more intensely, and that have made wild areas too
scarce for the indigenous practices of use-and-migrate. It should
be no surprise that modem indigenous resource use patterns are
55. PYNE, supra note 54, at 79.
56. For an example of pulse fIShing among Canadian Indians, see Berkes,
supra note 45, at 81.
57. Brightman, supra note 46, at 129, 135; see also Richard Hames, Game
Conservation oj Efficient Hunting?, in McCay & Acheson, supra note 15, at
92, 98 (noting that Brazilian indigenous hunters hunt more distant areas when
greater effort yields lower results nearby).
58. Townsend & Wilson, supra note 15, at 322-23 (noting a new theory of
a ·critical minimum" stock regeneration level). This appears to be compatible
with a ·pulse" harvest of wildlife-an intense but rotating harvest pattern-so
long as rotation is timely.
59. See, e.g. DE ONIS, supra note 16, at 139, 197-98 (advocating ·zoning" to
retain rainforest ecosystems).
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sometimes reduced to intensive harvesting, without the restorative
component of migration or rotation.60
Like indigenous periods, we ourselves face ever more limited
wild areas and are subject to ever intensifying resource pressure.
We need to regulate our own activities if we are going to preserve
these wild areas. If norms are to help us to do that, they must be
norms that direct our attention toward ourselves and the effects
that our activities have on environmental resources. The indige-
nous peoples' respect for wild things, and their humility about the
human role, may not carry us where we need to go-to a recogni-
tion that we ourselves are the problem, and to some conscious
management of our own behavior.61
And so the indigenous people's respect for the environment,
despite its great attractiveness, can have a serious disadvantage. It
may lead to a refusal to learn about our own impact on environ-
mental resources. This traditional respect sometimes generates
norms that are rooted in the bounty, rather than the scarcity, of
environmental resources. But we certainly can learn something
from these norms-notably an attitude of kinship with natural
things, and a positive, generous, and respectful view of our rela-
tionship to the natural surroundings.
One thing we learn from indigenous peoples is that living in
and from the wilderness makes one appreciate and respect it. By
contrast, we should realize that a disregard of environmental re-
sources may come from a lack of familiarity with or education
about them. Even modern hunters are profoundly aware and ap-
preciative of the habits and characteristics of wild animals, and
60. See MCGOODWIN, supra note 50, at 60-63 (describing instances in
which, in face of growing scarcity, local fishing populations intensified fishing
effort). For the modem efforts to preserve indigenous peoples and cultures by
preserving large land areas, see Leslie A. Brownrigg, Native Oultures and Pro-
tected Areas: Management Options, in CULTIJRE AND CONSERVATION: THE HUMAN
DIMENSION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 33 (Jeffrey A. McNeely & David Pitt
eds. 1985).
61. It should be noted, however, that some indigenous peoples have devel-
oped norms that effectively regulate their pressure on resources. See, e.g.
McEvoy, supra note 45, at 29-31 (describing California Indian norms of popula-
tion control, limited locationaJ rights, and resource-preserving rituals);
Brightman, supra note 46, at 138-39 (Cree alterations of norms of "respect" to
include overhunting).
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like it or not, hunters have traditionally been major contributors
to a number of environmental causes.62 If more of us knew and
experienced the wild, we might place greater value on wild things
as well.63 Perhaps that is why some of our most influential envi-
ronmental figures have been artists and writers; their representa-
tion of their own experience allows the rest of us to experience
indirectly the things that their artistry presents to us, and hence
we learn to value those things more. Among the modern gurus of
environmentalism, AIdo Leopold seemed in some ways to adopt
indigenous peoples' attitudes towards wild things, with his unsen-
timental interest in hunting and fishing, his close attention to the
creatures on his Wisconsin farm, and his aesthetic narrative gift
for conveying their behavior as sympathetic fellow members of a
larger ecological community.64 Like the indigenous peoples who
thought of themselves as interacting, communicating, and sympa-
thizing with wildlife, Leopold's much-discussed "land ethic" is in
many respects an ethic of kinship with a larger natural world.65
B. The Norms ofBiologic Rights
Western philosophic writers in recent years have developed a
certain analog to indigenous cultures' respect for nature. That
analog is expressed in the language of rights, notably animal
rights, but also rights of other biologic specimens. Like indigenous
peoples' cultural beliefs, the biologic rights approach suggests that
animals and plants are or should be in control of their own desti-
ny, and that human beings should control these creatures only
insofar as the creatures consent-that is, insofar they give them-
selves to humans. Unlike the indigenous cultural viewpoint, how-
ever, in which the animals and plants are often quite generous, the
rights approach suggests that this gift is a very rare event, and
62. For discussion of nineteenth century "sportsmen" hunters and wildlife
reserves, see TOBER, supra note 6, at 49-52.
63. See John V. Krotilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
777, 782 (1967) (noting that demand for wilderness resources may rise with
greater experience & knowledge).
64. ALoo LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949).
65. See J. BAIRD CAlJJCO'IT, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PHn.osoPHY 94, 194-98 (1989) (relating Leopold's land ethic to
Native American relationship to nature).
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that it is only hwnan preswnption that has appropriated so many
unwilling victims.
The underlying idea of the biologic rights approach is usually
an extension of a loose Kantianism to the nonhuman world. Just
as the Kantian ethicists envision hwnan subjects as ends-in-them-
selves who are not to be treated as mere instrwnents or means in
other peoples' projects, biologic rights adherents envision animals
and even plants as subjects unto themselves, not to be treated as
mere instrwnents of hwnan will.66
There has been a very considerable interest in this approach
in recent years, although the approach is beset with some charac-
teristic conundrwns. One set of difficulties, for example, revolves
around such problems as the natural propensity of wild animals
and plants to use each other instrwnentally, notably as prey.67
Critics question why hwnans should be different, particularly
when we are faced with biota that are particularly destructive to
us, like viruses. To be sure, not all animal rights advocates take
the position that viruses have rights, although some do.66 But if
not all animals· have rights, the issue shifts to the matter of de-
fining the characteristic that makes any given animal a rights-bear-
er.69 Is that characteristic consciousness?70 Is it the ability to
suffer?71 Or is it something else?
66. See DES JARDINS, supra note 42, at 126-28. The animal liberation think-
ers who stress avoidance of animal suffering, however, are a variant on these,
insofar as they use interest-based rather than rights-based justifications. See,
e.g. Peter Singer's position, discussed in DES JARDIN, supra note 42, at 124.
67. CAWCOTI', supra note 65, at 44-45 (discussing animal rights and envi-
ronmental ethics advocate Tom Regan).
68. See NASH, supra note 42, at 95 (describing writings defending hostile
life-forms like smallpox virus).
69. [d. at 124-25 (issue of moral eligibility); see also DES JARDINS, supra
note 42, at 130-31.
70. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Genera-
tions, PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 49 (William Blackstone, ed.,
1974).
71. Most famously stated by Jeremy Bentham: "[t)he question is not, Can
they [animals) reason? not Can they talk? but Can they svJJur1" JEREMY
BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, ch. 17,
§1, at 381. The best-known modern proponent is PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERA-
TION 7-8 (2d ed. 1990).
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Although these questions of internal logic are interesting, my
concern here is the function of these norms as paths to a meta-
norm of commons management. This more instrumental approach
inquires about what seems to be the helpful or problematic as-
pects of the biologic rights approach: how well can this ethic help
to support or advance a culture that combines use with care for
common resources?
From this perspective, the main difficulty with the biologic
rights approach is that, as the constitutional rights scholars say,
the approach is at once underinclusive and overinclusive. As to
underinclusiveness, biologic rights theories generally raise analytic
questions about the ground for seeing biota as rights-bearing sub-
jects-in-themselves, and this often leads the discussion to issues of
consciousness, purposiveness, or other matters of subjectivity that
might lend autonomous value to the subject. This effort to identify
rights-bearing characteristics is in some ways a narrowing enter-
prise, and generally speaking, Western biologic rights theories lack
the easy anthromorphism of indigenous normative patterns, which
can attribute characteristics of kinship or enmity to almost any
feature of nature. By contrast to indigenous inclusiveness, the
biologic rights debates tend to include rather little of the natural
world. One can easily attribute consciousness or some other da-
tum of subjectivity to a dog or perhaps even a lobster. But it is
much harder to do so for vegetation, not to speak of clouds, rocks
and other non-biologic elements of the environment.72 That, in
turn, means that the biologic rights approach extends only to a
segment, and not necessarily to a large segment, of the greater
environment.
As to the overinclusiveness problem, the biologic rights ap-
proach usually focuses on individual animals or biologic samples,
rather than whole species, and would protect those individuals
from any use or management. But what is needed for the protec-
tion of species and ecosystems are norms that will help us to use
the good things of nature in moderation. This sometimes does
involve management, and may even require the sacrifice of indi-
viduals for the sake of protecting the larger species. Weaker or
diseased animals, for example, may be culled to strengthen a
whole herd. While especially hardy species, particularly exotics,
72. See DES JARDINS, supra note 42, at 131.
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may have to be controlled in order to preserve native plants and
animals.73 Predator species like wolves used to do some culling
work, as implied in the Eskimo saying that the wolves strengthen
the caribou herd.74 But in a modem setting where wolves and
other natural predators are in short supply, we may have to do the
controlling ourselves. The biologic rights approach normally re-
jects this kind of management, and does so quite sharply; indeed,
biologic rights proponents have referred to this idea-sacrificing
the individual for the sake of a larger corrimunity-as environmen-
tal fascism. 75 But the cost of such careful attention to individuals
may be a weakening of the larger wild pool.
To be fair to the biologic rights approach, it was never really
motivated as much by a concern for commons management as by
a concern about cruelty. In the context of commons management,
however, the biologic rights approach magnifies the problems of
the respect-norm found in indigenous cultures. An enlarged re-
spect for biologic subjects may lead us to do things, or refrain
from doing things, to such a point that larger species and whole
ecosystems may be destroyed.
What can be gained from the biologic rights approach? ON
way to see the approach is as a metaphor, and as a kind of a
wake-up call about the autonomous value of nature, the approach
clearly does have some value for the management of an environ-
mental commons. Some may not fmd the biologic rights approach
very attractive aesthetically. Unlike the indigenous cultures' stress
on kinship and generosity, the biologic rights approach sometimes
73. For an example, see, e.g. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural
Resources, 471 F.Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1981) (state wildlife agency required to destroy feral sheep and goats, so as to
avoid destruction of critical habitat of an endangered bird species). Similarly,
in the plant domain, cattails and exotics need to be suppressed in the Ever-
glades if native vegetation is to survive. See Can the River of Grass Flow
Again, THE ECONOMIST, Jan 5, 1991, at 25. For a discussion of a variety of
exotic plants and animals threatening native species, see Mark A. Stein, Na-
tives Crowded Out.· Species that Run Amok, 1..A. Times, Feb. 22, 1989, at 1.
See also DES JARDINS, supra note 39, at 132-33. But see Kyla Seligsohn-Bennett,
Mismanaging Endangered and "Exotic" Species in the National Parks, 20
ENVI'L 1.. 415 (1990) (disputing definitions and management of "exotic" species).
74. FARLEY MOWATI, NEVER CRY WOLF 89-90 (1963).
75. See Tom Regan, Holism as Environmental. Fascism, in CONTEMPORARY
MORAL PROBLEMS 291-92 (James E. White ed., 1985).
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seems to suggest a rather cramped focus on entitlement, which in
turn suggests segregation and estrangement among species, a
condition in which gifts are rarely made across species lines.76
On the other hand, the metaphor of rights, like the perspectives of
indigenous cultures, stresses that natural resources are worthy of
respect-that nature is full of creatures that we should treat with
respect, and whose lives should not be entirely controlled by sin-
gle-minded human wishes and propensities. Moreover, the meta-
phor of rights carries its message in a vessel that is well-known in
western thinking. As with disquisitions about the rights of children
and the mentally incompetent, the rights-talk of animal and plant
life may be a way of awakening some people to the notion that
natural surroundings should be taken seriously.77
A second contribution of the biologic rights approach, al-
though contrary to the wishes of some of the rights theorists, is to
suggest the extension of some version of a rights rhetoric to
whole ecosystems.78 This is quite clearly a metaphoric use of the
rhetoric of rights, and it entails a radical divergence from the
individual-centered entitlements about which rights are normally
concerned. The language of "ecosystem rights" instead suggests
that individual plants or animals might have to be sacrificed for
the larger system that bears the metaphoric "right."
76. See CAWCOTr, supra note 65, at 33-34 (contrasting legalism of animal-
rights, with tribal peoples' attitude of respect, appreciation and acceptance of
danger and hardship vis-a-vis animals). See also Peter Singer's fastidiousness in
making sure that people knew he was not concerned out of fondness for ani-
mals. SINGER, supra note 71, at i-iii, ix, x, xi (explaining that he is not particu-
larly fond of animals, and that moral concern for animals has nothing to do
with such sentiments).
77. See, e.g. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cov-
er, 96 YALE 1..J. 1860, 1866-67, 1892-93, 1907-1908, 1910-11 (1987) (arguing that
rights-talk may elicit discussion of unconventional claims); Tribe, supra note
41, at 1345 (suggesting the same in an environmental context); see generally
CHRISTOPHER STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
NATURAL OBJECTS (1974), and CHRISTOPHER STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETIucs:
THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURAUSM (1988) (both focusing on moral status of non-
human entities). For a discussion of rights-talk as an environmental wake-up
call, see Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of
Economic Mephistopheles, 87 MICH. 1.. REV. 1631, 1645 (1989).
78. See NASH, supra note 42, at 164-69; cf STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETH-
ICS, supra note 77, at 107-108, 220-26 (seeing natural systems as having moral
considerability, if not rights).
HeinOnline -- 24 Envtl. L.  24 1994
24 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 24:1
On the other hand, this rhetoric functions precisely as a shift
of attention away from the legal entitlements of individual animals
or plants, refocussing on the "rightness" of their nature in the
Aristotelian sense in which things are dermed by their telos or
best nature. What is the right way for an elephant or tree to be?
Or for that matter, what is the right way for the clouds, the ozone
layer, or an entire ecosystem to be? What is the inherent and best
nature of these things, such that adherence to that nature is a
kind of health, and deviation is an illness? And what does this
teleologic nature suggest for our dealings with such things and our
life among them?
This is of course a very old approach both to ethics.and to
natural phenomena.79 Among modem writers in an environmental
genre, one sees the approach, even outside the rights language, in
the work of people like Wendell Berry, or once again, AIdo
Leopold Leopold's "land ethic" focussed expressly on what he
thought was the well-being of biotic communities, especially wild
ones.so Berry, on the other hand, is a farmer, albeit a
curmudgeonly one, concerned with domesticated animals and with
the right ways of farming.81 But like the group of writers known
as ecoferninists, Berry and Leopold seem intent not on conquering
nature, but on sympathetically exploring, understanding, and
working with the best "natures" of the ecological systems around
them.82 What those natures are, or whether there is a single such
nature for any ecosystem, is a subject of debate.83 But the debate
79. See, e.g. DES JARDlNS, supra note 42, at 151 (referring to Aristotle);
CAWcarr, supra note 65, at 28-29 (referring to Plato).
80. LEOPOLD, supra note 64, at 212, 220-25.
81. See, e.g. WENDELL BERRY, WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR? 114-16 (1990)
(stressing need for particular and sympathetic knowledge of places, animals).
Leopold was also a fanner in a sense; his Sand County Almanac was written
in large part about the creatures on his fann, though it had run more or less
wild. LEOPOLD, supra note 64.
82. For ecofeminism, see DES JARDlNS, supra note 42, at 239-41, 249-58.
Though there are a number of strands of this line of thinking, many link envi-
ronmental problems with an effort to dominate both women and nature in the
Western rationalist tradition. See, e.g. CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NA-
TURE 185-90 (1985) (discussing the mechanistic, anti-holistic, antifeminist charac-
ter of Baconian approach to science, in contrast to earlier organic approach).
The overlap with Berry's views is all the more interesting in light of some of
Berry's tangles with feminism on other fronts. See BERRY, supra note 81, at
178 (responding to critics who accused him of exploiting his wife as a typist).
83. See DANIEL BOTKIN, GLOBAL WARMING AND FORESTS OF THE GREAT LAKEs
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itself is a means by which an ethical position-concerned with the
health of natural communities-opens up a substantive discussion
of just what "commons" resources are important and why they are
important. This metaphor of ecological rights is also an ethic not
of domination, but of concern for the larger surroundings, taken
as wholes in all their complex interactions. In that sense, a rights-
ethic might resemble the ethic of respect that indigenous peoples
have for their surroundings.
C. Nature's Gift as Common Property
Although environmental good things seem to defy the idea of
property, there is a striking amount of property language in mod-
ern environmentalism. Even the notion of gift is a property con-
cept, and there are a good many more property metaphors in
environmental discussions. Take for example the slogan that ap-
pears from time to time in environmental campaigns: the environ-
ment is not something we inherit from our ancestors, it is said,
but something we borrow from our children.84 Or the words of
Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings about a special place, Cross Creek:
It seems to me that the earth may be borrowed but not
.bought. It may be used, but not owned. It gives itself in response to
love and tending, offers its flowering and fruiting. But we are ten~
ants and not possessors, lovers and not masters. Cross Creek be-
longs to the wind and the rain, to the sun and the seasons, to the
cosmic secrecy of seed and beyond all, to time.85
STATES: AN EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF QUANTITATIVE PROJECTIONS IN POLICY ANAir
YSIS 8-17, 36 (1991) (typescript, on file with the author) (arguing that systems
succeed each other indefinitely, and there is no "climax" system or steady
equilibrium in nature).
84. See, e.g. George DeWan, Endangered Species, NEWSDAY, April 7, 1993,
at 21 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt); Susan Tompor, Dow
Wants to be Known as Environmentalist Firm, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, May 1,
1990 (quoting Dow Chemical's 1990 Annual Report). The provenance of this
cite seems to be a bit· obscure. President George Bush cited two different
sources. See Remarks, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 18, 1991 (attributing saying
to Theodore Roosevelt); and Celebrating the Earth, special to the WASIDNGTON
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1990, at H 1 (attributing same to Native Americans). Another
member of the Bush administration evidently had other ideas: see Secretary of
State James Baker Addresses the National Governors' Association, FEDERAL
NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 26, 1990 (attributing same to Emerson).
85. Marjorie K. Rawlings, CROSS CREEK 368 (1942), quoted in Charles 1..
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Much more prosaically, the National Environmental' Policy Act
uses another trope from property, that of trusteeship and the
obligations among generations.86
These typical metaphors have some common elements. First
is the notion that resources are shared, and that the holders of
resources have some usufruct of these resources rather than ex-
clusive ownership. Second, they include a notion that this shared
usufruct is temporary to any given holder, a tenancy to be held
over time and then relinquished to the next holder. Third is the
notion that there is some core or center of the resource that is to
be maintained in its integrity for the others who will become its
tenants and use its fruits as well.
Those of us who teach property know that tenancy, trustee-
ship, and usufructory rights are all forms of ownership; but they
are forms of shared ownership, often for limited periods, in which
current users have responsibilities to others, especially others in
the future. Current tenants may not "waste" the property-that is,
they may take some of its product, but they may not do so in
ways that are disproportionate, or in ways that would destroy the
productive thing itself and its usefulness to later successors.87
Some quite similar notions appear in the law of trusts, in which
ownership is split between legal holders and the beneficiaries of
the trust property. The legal holder or "trustee" is generally sup-
posed to devise ways to secure the income or product for the
beneficiary, but also to behave prudently so as to preserve the
core property that produces that income, the res of the trust.86
In recent years a number of somewhat truculent commenta-
tors have criticized what they consider the merely alleged "tragedy
of the commons," noting that there are many successful examples
of common property. In these examples, the holders have devised
quite sophisticated devices for permitting limited individual uses
of common property-uses that, taken together, do not destroy
but rather tend to preserve the whole.89 These devices are typi-
Siemon, Who Oums Cross Creek, 5 J. OF LAND USE & ENVTL L. 323 (1990).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1)(l988).
87. See, e.g., Meyer v. Hansen, 373 N.W.2d 392 (N.D. 1985).
88. For the classic statement, see Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9
Pick.) 446 (1830). For some variations resulting from modern portfolio theory,
see Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REV. 603 (1970).
89. See, e.g., Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy of the Commons, 7 ENVTL
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cally enforced by customs and norms. Fishing norms are a com-
mon example, as are agricultural practices such as the very wide-
spread and long-lived practice of "stinting" the livestock that any
individual peasant may allow to roam on a common field.oo
These common-property arrangements have been used to
manage a great variety of resources. Common law courts have of-
ten adopted the customary patterns through which people regulate
their own behavior, and the common law thus often reflects these
common-property practices.91 During the years in which our own
great Eastern rivers were used for water power, for example,
owners of mills were expected to use the streamflow "reason-
ably."92 While they could drive their mills with the power of the
river waters, they were expected to do so in such a way as to
preserve the bulk of the water volume as it flowed past successive
mills on the way to the sea.Il3
Thus, some of Bentham's successors may have been thinking
about property too narrowly, as individual property exclusively at
the disposal of the individual owner. That is only one of our forms
of property, and while it is important, forms of common property
are important as well.94 There are great bodies of law about com-
mon property, and they revolve around an ethic of moderation,
proportionality, prudence, and responsibility to the others who are
entitled to share in the common resource. Indeed, even individual
property revolves around these normative characteristics. The
individual property-holder relies in great part on the recognition
ETHIcs 49 (1985); David Feeny et al., The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-
two Years Later 18 HUMAN EcoLOGY 1 (1990); see generally EuNOR OSTROM,
GoVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EvOLlITION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE Ac-
TION (1990).
90. See Feeny, supra note 89, at 10, and sources cited therein.
91. See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law
Development in California, 1850-1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource
Allocation in Nineteenth- Century America, 10 LAw & Soc'y REV. 235, 240-46
(discussing legal enforcement of Gold Rush miners' norms, with modifications);
Rose, supra note 31, at 739-45 (discussing enforcement of norms regarding
various customary uses of land).
92. See Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 193-95 (1852).
93. Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-
Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 261, 282-93 (1990).
94. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE 1.. J. 1315, 1332-
44 (1993).
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and acquiescence of others,95 and individual property law as-
sumes a large measure of neighborliness and attentiveness to the
needs of others in the use of one's own "exclusive" property.96
Property thus includes a normative "deep structure" that may
be of use in an environmental ethic. The norms that lurk in prop-
erty go beyond the wondrous power of exclusion that so awed
Blackstone in the case of individual property.97 They include as
well the qualities of restraint and responsibility that characterize
common or shared property. Property law is most visible when it
deals with breakdowns of these norms of restraint and responsi-
bility, but on the whole, property law assumes that these norms
do exist and predominate in our behavior. Hence, it is no accident
that environmental metaphors are often metaphors of proper-
ty-shared tenancy, trusteeship, stewardship, and even gift.
Modem environmentalism needs to build on the normative
metaphors of property. Of late, there has been a considerable
attentiveness to ways property devices might be used to control
environmental resources, including everything from abating air
pollution by creating tradeable emission rights for electrical utili-
ties98 to conserving rain forests by recognizing local countries'
property rights in the forests' wild genetic resources.99 A substan-
tial portion of the environmental community has resisted such
forays into property concepts, perhaps because they are presented
as appeals to self-interest, and involve the classical economic
move of harnessing private interest to the general wealth. 100
95. See Rose, supra note 12, at 81-85.
96. See, e.g. Rose, supra note 88, at 74445 (discussing rules of moderate
public use of private property). Nuisance law, of course, also builds in "reason-
able" overlaps among neighbors' uses.
97. 2 WIWAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
98. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-76510 (Supp. II 1990)
99. Roger A. Secijo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnologi-
cal Change, 35 J. L. & ECON. 199 (1992).
100. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) (approving "bubble" policy, an early version of property-type
efforts, opposed by a major environmental group); Martin Bern, Government
Regulation and the Development of Environmental Ethics Under the Clean Air
Act, 17 EcoL. L. Q. 539, 554-55 (1990) (arguing that economics-based thinking
is antithetical to ethical values); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH:
PmLOSOPHY, LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 77-81 (1988). Sagoff appears to be
ambivalent, however, insofar as he does accept tradeable emission rights. See
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The appeal to self-interest is indeed a significant aspect of
these property devices, but it is important to observe that there
are other nonnative opportunities in these property-based devices.
The rhetoric of property can easily encompass appeals to thrift
and carefulness, attentiveness to overuse, and maintenance of a
common stock These nonnative appeals can apply to new forms
environmental property as well. To be sure, an important facet of
such devices as transferable emission permits, for example, is that
an individual factory may buy and use such pollution entitlements
at will. But an even more important aspect of these permits is that
they constitute a very restrained entitlement, allowing the con-
sumption of only a very limited portion of a larger common prop-
erty, that is, a common property in the air itself. These devices are
the modem equivalent of the individual peasant's stint of livestock
on the common fields. The peasant indeed had his individual enti-
tlement, but he had to use it carefully and with due regard to th~
preservation of the larger commonly-held resource. The same may
be said of the modem factory's entitlement to consume a small
modicum of clean air, while leaving the bulk untouched as a re-
newable stock.
To be sure, it may be objected that the real frisson of the
wild is somehow not caught in these overly tame metaphors of
property, metaphors that smack too much of the garden and the
zoo, and too little of the crashing surf, the boiling clouds, and the
untrammelled, leaping mountain lion. Edward Abbey no doubt
helped to sharpen the divide between controlled property and un-
controlled wildness by observing that the wilderness is "only a
place where one e!\ioys the opportunity of being attacked by a
dangerous wild animal. "101
id., at 209-210; see also Rose, supra note 77, at 87. Other environmental
groups, notably the Environmental Defense Fund, have embraced entitlements
and related incentive systems as routes to pollution abatement John H.
Cushman, Clinton Urging Voluntary Goals on Air PoUution, N.Y. TiMES, Oct.
19, 1993, §A at 23.
101. EDWARD ABBEY, THE JOURNEY HOME: SoME WORDS IN DEFENSE OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 38 (1977). Cf ALLsToN CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YEu.oWSTONE:
THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK 318-25, 372-75 (1986) (ar-
guing the necessity of active wilderness management and scientific study, mix-
ing nature and culture, in contrast to what the author regards as ill-conceived
ideas of letting nature take its course).
\
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It is true that the normative focus of a property ethic is large-
ly anthropocentric, concentrating on the duties, practices, and
claims of people, now and in the future. Indeed, there is not really
much choice about this. Given the impact of human beings on
natural resources, everything "out there" in some sense must be
managed as a zoo or a garden. Nowadays, like it or not, even a
decision to do nothing represents a human option and a version of
human management.
Does this mean that property conceptions squeeze out all the
allure of uncontrolled wildness? Well, not always. Even in the
most tame, the most human-centered realms of property, one
often catches a glimpse of wildness. Every gardener knows that
shrubbery has a mind of its own, and even the beekeeper knows
that her honeybees are wild animals who choose to occupy her
hives. 102 These fleeting observations suggest that the
anthropocentrism of property is quite compatible with a kind of
stubborn assertiveness in what we anthropocentrically refer to as
"resources." However dim our vision, we all understand that plas-
tic trees are not the same as real ones. I03 While other writers
have given other reasons for the distinction, one real possibility is
that plastic trees are somehow too tame, too infinitely malleable,
and hence utterly incapable of interaction. Plastic trees won't talk
back. 104 But a real tree will talk back, even in a garden. It too
has its own elusive wild streak.
All this suggests a certain wildness even within property. And
on the other side of the coin, even the absence of property does
not necessarily mean complete wildness. People who live in what
we think of as "the wild" may not see it as wild at all. As one
American Indian remarked, "We did not think of the great open
plains, the beautiful rolling hills, and winding streams with tangled
102. See SUE HUBBELL, A BooK OF BEES . . . AND How TO KEEP THEM 110
(1988).
103. See Tribe, supra note 44, at 1347; Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees
to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 ILL. L. REV. 337, 345.
104. HOLMES ROlSl'ON, m, ENVIRONMENTAL ETIfics: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN
THE NATURAL WORW, 22-23 (1988) (discussing the "dialectical value" of wild
things); see also Farber, supra note 103, at 345 (compares plastic trees to
human-like robot).
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growth, as 'wild.' ... To us it was tame."I05 The West, though un-
owned as property, was tame to those who knew its ways.
These considerations suggest a certain breakdown in the
categories of tame and wild, and suggest that a modem environ-
mental ethic of property may benefit from the blurring of these
categories. We may see wildness even in the things we seem to
have turned into property; we may combine awe and respect for
these things with carefulness and moderation.
We can use the concepts of property, and especially common
property, to derive norms of responsibility and carefulness about a
shared trust that we want to last. Property concepts do indeed
make us understand ourselves to be the gardeners and zookeeperS
of what we call the wilderness, but they are also compatible with
an understanding that the resources of the great commons are not
simply "givens" that can be completely tamed and turned to our
pleasure. The qualities of the rain and the soil, the majesty of the
beasts and the mountains-these are qualities that most people
value in thinking of the environment. Property rhetoric can treat
these good things as gifts that people should hand along intact,
precisely because people have some feel for their otherness as
well as for their responsiveness to human management. 106 That
combination of respect for the thing itself, together with care for
other users, is what it means to have a "gift" that comes to us
from beyond our control-a gift that we pass along as yet another
gift to those who follow.
105. CIllEF LUTHER STANDING BEAR, LAND OF THE SI'O'ITED EAGLE, xix (1933),
quoted in T.C. McLUHAN, TOUCH THE EARTH 45 (1971). Chief Standing Bear was
an Oglala Sioux.
106. Cf BERRY, supra note 81, at 98-99 (asserting that earthly things to be
treated with care as gifts from God that are infused with God's spirit).
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